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Summary
We develop an endogenous growth model with capital, labor and energy as production
factors and three productivity variables that measure accumulated innovations for
energy production, energy savings, and neutral growth. All markets are complete and
perfect, except for research, for which we assume that the marginal social value exceeds
marginal costs by factor four. The model constants are calibrated so that the model
reproduces the relevant trends over the 1970-2000 period. The model contains a simple
climate module, and is used to assess the impact of Induced Technological Change
(ITC) for a policy that aims at a maximum level of atmospheric CO2 concentration (450
ppmv). ITC is shown to reduce the required carbon tax by about a factor 2, and to
reduce costs of such a policy by about factor 10. Numerical simulations show that
knowledge accumulation shifts from energy production to energy saving technology.
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Environmental taxes and regulation reduce pollution by shifting behavior away from polluting 
activities, but they also encourage the development of new technologies that make pollution 
control less costly in the long run (Newel et al. 1999; Popp 2002). Understanding of the response 
of technology to economic incentives – dubbed induced innovation or induced technological 
change (ITC) – will prove crucial for designing appropriate environmental policies (Jaffe et al. 
2002). In the literature, the subject of ITC has explicitly been studied in various theoretic models 
(e.g. Verdier 1995, Beltratti 1997, Newell et al. 1999, Goulder and Matthai 2000). In a slightly 
different strand of literature, a more general approach is followed when adapted endogenous 
growth models are used to investigate the effect of reduced resource use on growth (Gradus and 
Smulders 1993; Bovenberg and Smulders 1995; den Butter and Hofkes 1995; Bovenberg and 
Smulders 1996; Smulders 1999, Smulders and de Nooij 2003). Many of these studies develop 
endogenous growth models with capital and/or labour, and a natural resource, most often energy, 
as factors of production, in which economic growth is generated through the accumulation of 
knowledge. Such models are advantageous when one aims to study the effect on growth of 
resource conservation rules. One conclusion emerging from these studies is that abatement 
measures can increase growth when they reduce pollution and pollution harms the production of 
knowledge. In most other cases, resource use reduction harms growth. 
  In this paper, we build an endogenous growth model, comparable with those used in the 
second strand of literature, with three sectors; the first sector produces the final good, the second a 
generic intermediate, and the third produces energy. The final good uses the generic intermediate 
and energy as production factors, and productivity of both inputs is endogenous through 
technology driven by research. Both the intermediate and energy sector use a capital-labor 
composite as production factor, and also for these sectors, productivity of the input depends on a 
technology variable that measures accumulated (and depreciated) research. A major difference 
with the average endogenous growth model that includes a resource, though, is that we model 
energy as an intermediate good. The energy production technology, and thus the energy 
production costs, is endogenous to the model. A second major difference is that our model is 
calibrated to reproduce the trends of the past decades in overall growth and energy efficiency 
improvement. 
  The model is used to carry out policy analyses that verify the role of ITC in climate change 
policy. It thereby contributes to the literature on induced technological change in the context of  3
climate change, which is a yet undecided debate (Carraro et al. 2003). Various studies try to 
estimate the impact of ITC relative to the factor substitution effects without technological change 
through scenario analyses (Carraro and Galeotti 1997, Grübler and Messner 1998, Goulder and 
Schneider 1999, Nordhaus 2002, van der Zwaan et al. 2002, Buonanno et al. 2003, Gerlagh and 
van der Zwaan 2003, Gerlagh and Lise, 2003). But the estimated contribution of ITC varies 
considerably between the studies. Carraro and Galeotti (1997) employ an econometric model for 
the EU and come to an optimistic conclusion. ITC can bring about a double dividend when proper 
R&D incentives will reduce emissions without the need for decreasing consumption. Grübler and 
Messner (1998) use an energy-system model and conclude that ITC substantially decrease costs 
and warrant early emission reduction efforts. Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Nordhaus (2002) 
are more pessimistic and conclude that, though ITC is not negligible, its contribution to 
greenhouse gas emission abatement is small when compared to the contribution of factor 
substitution for given technology. Gerlagh and Lise (2003) consider two competing energy 
sources (i.e. renewables and carbon-rich energy sources). They show that induced technology 
change accelerates the substitution of carbon-free energy for fossil fuels substantially, and that in 
this setting, induced technological change is a powerful contributor to emission reductions. 
  One specific issue that we address in this paper is the question whether endogenous 
technological change (ETC) is beneficial to climate change policies. From the outset, such is not 
obvious. While ETC increases flexibility and thereby reduces costs, it can also increase costs 
when lower output levels lead to lower investments in learning. It is not unreasonable to assume 
that economic output will decrease more with endogenous technology, compared to a situation 
with an exogenous technological path. In this paper, we will verify whether costs of energy 
reductions increase or decrease when we account for endogenous technological change, and by 
how much. The approach is as follows. As in many other studies, we define scenarios in which 
policy sets an environmental target (i.e. atmospheric carbon emission concentration) with 
endogenous carbon taxes to reach the target. ITC is beneficial when costs of reaching this target 
decrease when modeling endogenous technological change, compared to a scenario in which 
technology follows a benchmark path set by the benchmark (or ‘business as usual’) scenario 
without environmental target. Our finding is important since most costs estimates for climate 
change policies assume given technology, and their estimates may be realistic when the ITC 
impact factor is minor, but it may be too pessimistic or too optimistic when the ITC impact factor 
is large. 
  When carrying out numerical scenario analyses, caution is warranted. We are aware of the 
limitations of the modeling approach we follow. In a certain way, we develop a cartoon model in 
the tradition of the highly stylized models developed in endogenous growth theory. The model 
explores some specific mechanisms, while abstracting from other mechanisms. Just to mention 
one feature, we neglect all taxes and other market distortions apart from carbon taxes. Still we  4
think our analysis can provide valuable qualitative insights on technological innovation as induced 
by climate change policy. Also, we attempt to reduce the sensitivity of our results with respect to 
specific model features as we calibrate the model such that it reproduces the recent past and 
produces a benchmark scenario that is in line with other studies. 
  Section 2 describes the basic features of the model. It describes the accumulation of 
knowledge and the linkage from energy use to climate change. Section 3 describes the calibration 
of the model. Section 4 provides the results of the simulations. The final section discusses the 
implications of our analysis for climate change policies. Two Appendices are added to the paper. 
Appendix 1 presents the full list of model equations, including the first order conditions for the 
energy producers and innovators. The numerical parameter values, as found in the calibration 
procedure, are presented in Appendix 2. 
2. MODEL SET UP 
The model has 60 distinct time periods of five years, each denoted by t=1,…,60, covering the 
period 2000-2300. The model distinguishes one representative consumer, a representative 
production technology, and a public agent that can set emission taxes to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. There is one final good, or consumer good, for which prices are normalized to unity. 
All other prices are measured relative to this good. 
 
The representative consumer 
 
We assume there is one representative consumer who maximises welfare subject to a budget 
constraint: 
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution between M and E, and AY,M and AY,E are the technology 
variables that control the productivity of M and E, respectively. The parameters πY,M and πY,E 
describe the elasticity of productivity to knowledge accumulation. 
  Both the generic intermediate M and energy E are produced using a capital-labor composite Z 
as production factor, 
Mt = ςM AM,Z
πM,Z ZM ( µ) (3) 
Et = ςE AE,Z
πE,Z ZE ( q) (4) 
ZM,t + ZE,t = (Kt)
α(Lt)
1–α ( ξ) (5) 
where AY,M and AY,E are technology variables that control the productivity of the capital-labor 
composite in producing M and E, respectively. The parameters πM,Z and πE,Z describe the elasticity 
of productivity to knowledge accumulation. The variables between brackets, µ, q, and ξ, denote 
the Lagrange dual variables of the welfare maximization program, or stated otherwise, denote the 
shadow price for M, E, and Z, respectively. 
  Capital depreciates at rate δK, and accumulates through investments I, 
Kt+1 = (1–δk)Kt + It. (ψ) (6) 
Knowledge is produced on basis of research. All knowledge stocks, AY,M, AY,E, AY,M, and AY,E are 
treated equally, and we use subscript j=(Y,M), (Y,E), (M,Z), (E,Z) when convenient. The 
accumulation of knowledge depends on both the current stock of knowledge, Aj, and the level of 
research expenditures, Rj. The flow of new ideas has decreasing returns to scale in the research 
flow Rj, the so-called fishing-out effect (Caballero and Jaffe 1993; Kortum 1993).  




   (θj, j=(Y,M), (Y,E), (M,Z), (E,Z)) (7) 
 
where δA is the share of knowledge that becomes obsolete in each period. 
  The model is closed by the commodity balance for the final good; output Y is used for 
consumption C, investments I, and research expenditures R. 
Ct + It + Rt = Yt,   (λ) (8) 
where R is the aggregate research level, 
R = RY,M + RY,E + RM,Z + RE,Z    (9) 
  6
Labour Lt is supplied inelastically. We assume it is a fixed ratio of population, i.e. Lt = γ Pt with 
0< γ <1 and Pt is the total population. In turn, population is assumed to grow logistically: 
Pt+1 = (1+χ(1–Pt/P
LT))Pt, (10) 
where γ is the population growth rate for low population levels and P
LT is the population level in 
the long term to which Pt converges. 
  The model assumes complete and perfect markets for all goods, except for research. That is, 
the model imposes the first order conditions that follow from the welfare maximization program, 
presented in the appendix. For research, it is assumed that the marginal social value of research 
exceeds the marginal social costs by factor ω (Baumol 2002, p135). For ω=1, the model would 
calculate a first-best allocation. For ω>1, the social benefits of research exceed the costs. Thus, 
there is a research externality in the model. This is important for climate change policies for the 
following reason. A policy measure that will increase the total research effort will tend to increase 
welfare, whereas a policy measure that decreases the overall research effort will tend to decrease 





Carbon dioxide emissions, Emt, are linked to the use of energy through an emission intensity 
parameter εt that describes the level of emissions per unit of energy use: 
Emt = εt Et.                                                                                         (11) 
We assume that emission intensity of energy use and energy efficiency of production improves 
(so-called energy-efficiency improvement or EEI) autonomously over time. Carbon emissions are 
linked to the atmospheric carbon concentration, which in turn determines the global average 
surface temperature. The carbon cycle dynamics assumed in our model are simple and follow the 
approximations supposed in DICE (Nordhaus, 1994) and DEMETER (Gerlagh and Van der 
Zwaan, 2003). The link between carbon emissions, atmospheric carbon concentration ATMt and 
the global surface temperature, TEMPt, is a “1-box representation”: 
ATMt+1 = (1–δM)(ATMt–ATMo) +(1–δE)(Emt–Ēmt),                        (12) 
TEMPt+1 = (1–δT) TEMPt + δT TEMPo ln(ATMt/ATMo)/ln(2), (13)  7
where δM is the atmospheric CO2 depreciation rate, ATMo is the pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 
concentration, 1–δE is the retention rate, Ēmt are emissions not linked to energy production , δT is 
the temperature adjustment rate resulting form the atmospheric warmth capacity, and TEMPo is 
the long-run equilibrium temperature change associated with a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 
concentration. The model version used for this paper does not specify a damage function, though 
such an equation can simply be added. The reason is that damage estimates are subject to 
normative debates on the valuation of environmental losses, and we attempt to keep away from 
these discussions. Instead, we will run cost-effective analyses that assume a certain climate 
change target. 
  To reach climate change targets, the public agent may levy a tax τt on emissions Emt 
produced by the final good sector when using energy. The public agent may levy a tax on 
emissions produced by the final good producer when using energy in production. This carbon tax 
is a fee expressed in $/tC, τE,t , and it adds a constant markup value to the energy users costs, 
q
τ
t = qt+τE,tεt, (14) 
where q
τ
t is the price of energy including the carbon tax, qt is the production costs of energy, and 
εt the emission intensity as defined in equation (11). We assume that the public agent is budget 
neutral in the case of a tax policy, so that, on the other hand, if a carbon tax is levied, i.e. τt>0, the 
generic intermediate M is subsidized with a rate sM,t  
µ
τ
t = (1–sM,t)µt, (15) 
where µ
τ
t is the intermediate price of M including the subsidy. The carbon tax revenues and the 
total amount of subsidies are in balance: 
τE,tεtEt = sM,tµtMt. (16) 
Alternatively, we could assume that carbon tax revenues are recycled by research subsidies, but 
this would produce a bias in our results in favor of carbon taxes. Under our central assumption of 
research externality ω>1, even without carbon taxes, a subsidy on research would increase total 
welfare. Selling an innovation subsidy as a natural by-product of carbon taxes mixes up climate 
change policies and generic research policies. 
3. CALIBRATION 
We use the model outlined above to carry out a numerical simulation where model parameters are 
based on historical trends derived from the World Development Indicator (WDI) set for the period 
1960 to 2000. Based on the WDI data, we estimate levels and growth rates for the main variables  8
for the period 2000-2005. In the second calibration stage, the model starts in 1900 and runs to 
2300, and we calculate parameters such that simulated variable levels and growth rates in the 
period 2000-2005 match the empirical data. This scenario is the benchmark, and is also referred to 
as Business as Usual (BAU). 
  Variables that are used as an input in the calibration process are population (P), labor (L) 
population growth (gL), output or GDP (Y), GDP growth rate (gY), gross investments (I), the 
capital stock (K), total primary energy supply and total primary energy use measured in Exa 
Joules (E), the energy price in $/GJ (q) and its growth rate (gq), the energy-efficiency 
improvement (EEI), CO2 emissions (Em), the decline in the emission intensity of energy (gε), 
overall research expenditures (R), and the real interest rate. These 15 data points are used to 
calibrate the 17 parameters P
LT, γ, χ, ζY,E, ζM,Z, ζE,Z, πY,E, πM,Z, πE,Z, ςM, ςZ, δK, δA, ρ, α, ε, and the 
growth rate of ε. We notice that there is freedom for the choice of the unit of measurement for 
knowledge, AM,Z and AE,Z.
1 Thus, there are two degrees of freedom in the calibration process, 
which is used to compensate for the difference between the 15 data points and the 17 parameters 
calculated. Furthermore, there are some parameters chosen on basis of the literature. The elasticity 
of substitution between energy and the generic intermediate M is described by the parameter σ, for 
which we following Manne (1999), σ=0.4. The social returns on research are assumed to exceed 
the private returns by factor 4 (Baumol 2002, p135), thus, ω=4. The elasticity of knowledge 
accumulation to research is set to half, η=0.5. Finally, we take πY,M=0, so that AY,M and ζY,M, drop 
out of the model. We can do so without loss of generality since all energy-neutral innovation is 
already captured through the variables RM,Z and AM,Z. 
  In 2000, the world population (P2007) is 6.1 billion people, and its growth rate is 1.2%. In the 
long run, the world population is assumed to stabilize at a level of 11.4 billion people (as in World 
Bank, 1999; and Nakicenovic et al. 1998; and Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan, 2003). We assume 
that labor force is a fixed rate of population, i.e. γ=0.48, as indicated by the most recent WDI data. 
We calculated per capita GWP in 2000 at 5.800 US$(1995), and the trend of the per capita GWP 
growth rate at 1.7% per year. In 2000, total energy use is estimated at 326 EJ per year. The energy 
intensity (ratio of energy use over GDP) is approximately 10.5 GJ/$, and on basis of the 1971–
1991 WDI sample, we estimate the Energy Efficiency Improvement (EEI) at 1% per year. The 
initial average price of energy (q) is assumed to be 2.7 US$(1995)/GJ, and almost constant. The 
autonomous improvement of the emission intensity is 0.2% per year, and for the year 2000, the 
emission intensity is estimated at 0.0155 kgC/GJ. The CO2 emissions (Em2000) amount to almost 6 
Gigaton carbon (GtC) per year. 
                                                   
1 We can increase AM,Z by any factor and decrease ςM by the same factor (raised to the power πM,Z) and represent 
the same equilibrium with the same flows M and E. Thus, in the calibration, there is arbitrage between AM,Z, and 
ςM, and between AE,Z and ςE. Practically, we set AM,Z, to 100, and demand that ςM=ςE.  9
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Policy Scenarios 
 
This section presents and discusses the results with the calibrated model. After the calibration 
stage, we use the model for simulations. The simulation model runs for 60 time steps of 5 years 
each, representing the period 2000-2300, though the presentation of data and figures will be 
restricted to the first two centuries 2000-2200. State variables (knowledge and capital stocks) are 
fixed at the beginning of this period. We have simulated four scenarios. First, the BAU scenario 
assumes the absence of carbon taxes. 
  In the second scenario, policy makers are supposed to employ the carbon tax instrument such 
that total research expenditures are maximized. That is, the carbon tax is not used to combat 
emissions, but to increase welfare derived from the consumption of final goods. The background 
to this policy is the understanding that a carbon tax supported by a subsidy on the intermediate M 
might increase the overall research effort, or decrease the overall research effort, and it is not 
known in advance which of the two possibilities holds. In case the overall research level is 
increased, this will increase welfare since the marginal social benefits of research exceed the 
marginal social costs by factor ω>1. Whether a carbon tax will increase or decrease the overall 
research levels cannot be concluded in advance, it depends on parameter values that follow from 
the calibration process. The second scenario is labeled MAXW. 
  Then, we consider two stabilization scenarios, labeled 450_ITC and 450_NOITC that target 
the atmospheric carbon concentration level at 450 ppmv. In the BAU scenario, this carbon 
concentration level will be reached around 2050. In both stabilization scenarios, there is a variable 
carbon tax (in $/tC) levied on energy use to achieve the target. Figure 1 plots the emission levels 
and Figure 2 plots the associated carbon concentration levels. Figure 1 shows that, for our simple 
1-box atmospheric model, the 450 ppmv target is consistent with long-term constant annual 
emissions of about 3.2 GtC. Comparison of the third and fourth scenario can show us the 
importance of induced technological change relative to factor substitution that happens with the 




From the comparison of the four scenarios, we will draw conclusions with respect to the relation 
between ETC and (i) the timing of emission reductions, (ii) the carbon tax levels required to reach 
climate stabilization targets, (iii) the costs of meeting the climate change constraints, and (iv) the 
direction of technological change.  10
  From Figure 1, the first outstanding conclusion is that the endogenous growth model suggests 
a win-win policy exists. The second scenario, which maximizes welfare abstracting from climate 
change costs, results in lower emission levels compared to the benchmark. A modest carbon tax 
(Figure 3 and Figure 4) raises expenditures in energy savings R&D (Figure 7) and lowers 
expenditures for energy production R&D  (Figure 9). The overall R&D expenditures are lifted by 
0.04% of GDP. Given that the social benefits of R&D exceed the costs, consumption increases, by 
0.19% in 2050 and by 0.26% in 2100 (Figure 6). 
  The second conclusion we draw from Figure 1 and Figure 2 is that ITC (the third scenario) 
implies a slight advancement of emission reductions, compared to the fourth scenario without 
ITC. In Figure 2, the two graphs for the two scenarios are almost on top of one another, but in 
Figure 1, a difference is visible. This finding is consistent with Grübler and Messner (1998) and 
van der Zwaan et al. (2002). The result, however, should be interpreted with care, given the 
findings for the second scenario. A substantial part of the advancement of emission reductions is 
due to the carbon-tax induced welfare gain that is independent of the climate change constraint, as 
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FIGURE 1. Annual emission levels  FIGURE 2. Atmospheric CO2 concentration 
levels 
 
Next, we turn to the implications of ITC for the level of the carbon tax. It is obvious that an 
economy with endogenous technology is more flexible and in the long-term, technological change 
increases the elasticity of emissions. Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the tax on carbon dioxide 
emissions that supports the energy reductions. They show that ITC cuts the required carbon tax by 
approximately half. Stated the other way around, ITC doubles the elasticity of emissions with 
respect to a carbon tax. The tax levels shown for the end of the 21
st and the whole 22
nd century do 
not seem realistic from a political perspective. In the longer term, however, we can expect the 
substitution between carbon rich and carbon poor energy sources to contribute substantially to 
emission reductions (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan 2004) and long-term carbon taxes required to 
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FIGURE 3. Carbon tax  FIGURE 4. Carbon tax for first five decades 
 
The effect of ITC on the costs of climate change targets is even stronger than its effect on the 
elasticity of emissions. Figure 5 shows the development of consumption per capita, and Figure 6 
shows the same path, but now relative to the benchmark BAU scenario. The first figure shows 
that, on the scale of long-term income growth, costs of meeting climate change targets are almost 
negligible. Azar and Schneider (2003) and Gerlagh and Papyrakis (2003) discuss the relevance of 
this finding, which is a common feature found in many analyses with IAMs. Figure 6 shows that, 
notwithstanding the small size of the costs compared to the overall income growth, costs are still 
substantial and significantly different between the two scenarios with and without ITC. 
Abstracting from ITC, the emission reduction by about two-third, in the 22
nd century, decreases 
output and consumption by about 5%. When technology adjusts, costs decrease to below 1% of 
GDP. When calculating the costs in terms of the welfare measure as defined in (1), we find that 
ITC decreases the costs by factor 11.8. Thus, studies based on inflexible technology may vastly 































BAU MAXW 450_ITC 450_NOITC
 
FIGURE 5. Output per capita  FIGURE 6. Development of consumption relative 
to BAU scenario. 
 
The next figures present R&D expenditures and the paths of technology, that is, how technology 
accumulation adjusts to climate change policy. Figure 7 presents the share of R&D in GDP that is  12
used to increase the productivity of energy in the production of the final good. Comparing the 
third (450_ITC) and the first (benchmark) scenario, we see that the climate change policy 
increases energy saving R&D by about factor 4/3 in the short-term, and by about factor 2 in the 
long term. The carbon tax peaks at the end of the 21
st century, and so the energy savings R&D 
expenditures peak around the same period. Figure 8 presents the implications for the development 
of the stock of energy savings knowledge, AYE. In the benchmark scenario, energy savings 
knowledge increases by almost factor 4 over the current century. The increased R&D 
expenditures induced by the carbon tax enhance the accumulation of energy savings knowledge 
by another factor 2. 
 








































BAU MAXW 450_ITC 450_NOITC  
FIGURE 7. R&D expenditures for Energy 
Savings as share of GDP 
FIGURE 8. Development of Energy Savings 
Knowledge, AYE, relative to level in 2000 
 
Figure 9 presents the effect of the carbon-tax on the energy production technology. The effect is 
opposite to the energy savings technology. A carbon tax captures part of the value of energy 
supply, and thereby reduces the revenues that can be invested in research increasing the efficiency 
of energy production. The R&D expenditures are about halved, and consequently, the knowledge 
stock is halved, compared to the benchmark, as well, as shown in Figure 10. 
 









































BAU MAXW 450_ITC 450_NOITC  
FIGURE 9. R&D expenditures for Energy  FIGURE 10. Development of Energy Production  13
Production as share of GDP  Knowledge, AEZ, relative to level in 2000 
 
Comparing the two knowledge stocks, we see that the carbon tax shifts knowledge from 
efficient energy production to efficient energy use. We also mention that the R&D levels for the 
generic productivity of M is almost unaffected (not shown in a graph). In the climate change 
constrained scenario, energy production is less efficient than in the benchmark scenario, but 
energy use is more efficient. Costs involved in this shift of knowledge are small, compared to 
costs involved in factor substitution. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have built an endogenous growth model with three sectors, and with endogenous 
technology for each of the sectors. The first sector produces the final good, the second a generic 
intermediate, and the third produces energy. Energy production and use lead to emissions of 
carbon dioxide, and the model contains a simple climate change module that links emissions to 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration levels and temperature change. This module can also be 
used inversely to define a window of emission paths that are consistent with an exogenous climate 
change target, such as an atmospheric 450 ppmv ceiling. 
  We have used numerical simulations to study the potential for a double dividend, that is, a 
reduction in emissions and increase in output, at the same time. Climate change policy can bring 
about a double dividend when an energy savings policy increases the R&D level in certain sectors 
more than it decreases the R&D level in other sectors, assuming that social returns to R&D are the 
same in both sectors. Indeed, when parameter values where calibrated to match the 1970-2000 
growth levels for output and energy use, we found a double dividend for modest energy savings. 
Yet when energy savings were more stringent to be consistent with a 450 ppmv stabilization 
target economic growth fell. 
  The model is also used to carry out policy analyses that verify the specific role of ITC in 
climate change policy. We conclude from the results that ITC’s contribution to greenhouse gas 
emission abatement can be substantial. In our calculations, the elasticity of emissions to a carbon 
tax doubles, and the costs of emission reductions drop by approximately factor 10. In this setting, 
induced technological change proves a powerful contributor to emission reductions. 
  Our finding is important since most cost estimates for climate change policies assume given 
technology, and their estimates may be too pessimistic. There are two apparent qualifications to 
be made. First, results crucially depend on parameter values, which do not only depend on growth 
rates over the period on which the model is calibrated for output and energy use, but which also 
depend on various assumptions such as on the relative value of research expenditures and the  14
social rate of return on research. For future work, it is essential to gather more data that allow us a 
more robust calibration procedure. Second, the model assumes a long-term planning and 
cooperation on a global scale. When climate change targets are set on a shorter horizon and 
cooperation is incomplete, such as under the Kyoto Protocol, technology will be less adaptive and 
climate change policy costs increase. 
  Having said this, we want to emphasize that not all results are sensitive. It seems intuitive that 
a carbon tax will shift innovations between sectors, from sectors that are responsible for fossil fuel 
energy production to sectors that are responsible for energy savings and carbon-free energy 
production. It is this shift in research that will drive most of the long-term cost reductions for 
climate change mitigation policies. This also points to an important caveat in the current study. 
Inclusion of carbon capturing and sequestration and carbon-free energy sources is an apparent 
subject for further work. 
 
APPENDIX 1. FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS FOR FIRMS’ PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
We use βt as the price deflator for the final good from period t to period t+1. So, βt = 1/(1+rt), 
where rt is the real interest rate. Welfare optimisation gives the Ramsey rule as a first-order-
condition for consumption, 
βt = (Ct /Pt)/((1+ρ)(C t+1/Pt+1)) (17) 
The first order conditions for M, E, ZM, ZE, K, AY,M, AY,E, AM,Z, AE,Z, RY,M, RY,E, RM,Z, RE,Z, 










ξZM = µM, (20) 
ξZE = qE,  (21) 
α ξ(ZM+ZE) = (δk + ψ – 1)K, (22) 




+ βθY,M,+1 [(1– δA) + (1–ηY,M)ζY,M(RY,M/AY,M)
 ηY,M], (23) 




+ βθY,E,+1 [(1– δA) + (1–ηY,E)ζY,E(RY,E/AY,E)
 ηY,E], (24)  15
θM,Z = πM,Z µM/AM,Z + βθM,Z,+1 [(1– δA) + (1–ηM,Z)ζM,Z(RM,Z/AM,Z)
 ηY,Z], (25) 
θE,Z = πE,Z qE/AE,Z + βθE,Z,+1 [(1– δA) + (1–ηE,Z)ζE,Z(RE,Z/AE,Z)
 ηE,Z], (26) 
ω = βθj,+1 [ηj ζj(Aj/Rj)
1–ηj].  j=(Y,M), (Y,E), (M,Z), (E,Z) (27) 
ψ+1 = 1/β,  (28) 
 
In a first-best optimum, we would have ω=1. As explained in the main text, however, it is 
assumed that in market equilibrium, ω=4. 
 
Carbon tax scenario 












The complete model consists of the 21 endogenous variables: for W, Y, R, C, M, E, ZM, ZE, K, 
AY,M, AY,E, AM,Z, AE,Z, RY,M, RY,E, RM,Z, RE,Z, I, Em, Atm, Temp, 8 shadow prices µ, q, ξ, ψ, 
θY,M, θY,E, θM,Z, θE,Z, and 1 price deflator β. The model has and 30 equations: (1)-(6), 4x(7), 
(9)-(8), (11)-(13), (17), (18)-(26), 4x(27), (28). The model has 2 exogenous variables, P, L, and 16 
economic parameters, ρ, σ, ςM, ςE, α, δK, δA, 4xζj, 4xηj, ω and 5 climate change parameters, 
εt, δM, δE, δT,  TEMPo. There are two policy instruments τM and τc, that are linked through (16)  16
APPENDIX 2. CALIBRATION RESULTS 
TABLE 1. Variable and parameter values in first period (2000)  
Parameters  Per period    Endogenous variables  Per period  per year 
ρ  0.186
#   Y  217.300* 44.025 
α  0.252
#    C  161.220 33.031 
δK   0.351
#    I  43.500* 8.819 
δA  0.229
#    M
  224.120 44.824 
σ  0.400    E
  21.320* 4.284 
ςM  2.092
#   K  86.900*  
ςE  2.092
#   R  10.856 2.186 
ω 4.000    RY,M  n.a.  
η  0.500   RY,E  0.520 0.104 
ζ Y,M n.a.    RM,Z
  10.000* 2.014 
ζ Y,E 10.611
#   RE,Z  0.336 0.067 
ζ M,Z 1.278
#   AY,M
  n.a.  
ζ E,Z 9.522
#   AY,E  503.004  
π Y,M 0.000    AM,Z
  100.000*  
π Y,E 0.765
#   AE,Z  262.062  
π M,Z 0.321
#   ZM  24.129 4.826 
π E,Z 0.495
#   ZE  0.651 0.130 
     ψ  1.280  
     q  0.270*  
     µ  0.957  
Environmental variables  ξ  8.885   
     θY,M
  n.a.  
     θY,E 0.032   
Exogenous Variables     θM,Z
  2.561  
P (billion)  6.730    θE,Z  0.039  
     χY,M
  n.a.  
L (manyr)  16.152    χY,E 0.941   
     χM,Z
  0.970  
Pmax  11.360   χE,Z  0.941  
Exogenous variables growth rates  Variables growth rates    
     β  0.784*  
gL   0.061    gY  0.141* 0.027 
gPop   0.061    gM  0.087 0.027 
     gE = gY – EEI 0.087*  0.017 
     gK  0.150 0.028 
     gq  0.000*  0.002 
     gµ 0.002  0.000 
     gξ  0.054  
     gA,Y,M  n.a.  
     gA,Y,E  0.112  
     gA,M,Z  0.170  
     gA,E,Z  0.112  
     gZ,M  0.084  
      gZ,E 0.031   
* The variables with an * have been based on empirical data, and are used as input in the 
calibration process. 
# The parameters with an # have been calculated as part of the calibration process  17
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